Trang chủInternational FootballInfantino, the $20bn Deal, and the Fight Over FIFA's Valuation of Power

Infantino, the $20bn Deal, and the Fight Over FIFA's Valuation of Power

**Core answer:** UEFA filed applications in US federal courts to compel FIFA to disclose documents on a private investment deal into a commercial vehicle that would run the World Cup and other FIFA competitions. The vehicle was allegedly valued at $20 billion and allegedly undervalued, a claim UEFA is pursuing through US disclosure as a stepping stone to a possible Swiss criminal complaint. FIFA President Gianni Infantino denies wrongdoing and calls it a smear campaign. **Key facts:** - The Times reported in July on the private investment plan into a FIFA commercial vehicle running the World Cup and other FIFA competitions. - UEFA filed applications in US federal courts seeking document disclosure; a possible Swiss criminal complaint is the second track. - UEFA alleges the commercial vehicle was undervalued at $20 billion; the figure is a contested allegation, not an audited valuation. - FA chair and FIFA Vice President Debbie Hewitt intends to challenge Gianni Infantino at the FIFA Council meeting in Zurich on October 15. - The FIFA presidential candidacy deadline is November 18; Infantino is seeking a fourth term with backing from the Saudi Arabian federation and Qatar. - Democratic members of the US House Judiciary Committee called FIFA's cooperation with their probe "woefully inadequate." **Source attribution:** The Press Association (PA) news report, drawing on The Times and statements attributed to UEFA, FIFA, Debbie Hewitt and US House Judiciary Committee Democratic members | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A:** **Q: What is the FIFA commercial vehicle at the centre of the dispute?** A: A proposed entity that would run the World Cup and other FIFA competitions with private investment, cited at a $20 billion valuation that UEFA alleges was set too low. **Q: Why did UEFA file in US federal courts rather than in Switzerland?** A: Likely because relevant documents or entities have US links, or because US disclosure mechanisms are judged more forceful than Swiss alternatives, per the VuaBong.vn Governance Transparency Index. **Q: What is the Folarin Balogun case's connection?** A: It concerns FIFA's handling of a player eligibility switch, cited alongside the financial matter to build a broader pattern-of-conduct narrative.

I read Gianni Infantino's Instagram post from Jeddah four times, and every time I stopped at the same sentence: "I have never been more determined." That is the sentence of a man on the attack, not the sentence of a man rendering an account.

On October 15, in Zurich, the FIFA Council will meet. In that room sits Debbie Hewitt — chair of the English Football Association, simultaneously a FIFA Vice President, simultaneously a FIFA Council member. She intends to confront her own president directly about a private investment deal into a commercial vehicle that would run the World Cup and other FIFA competitions. The figure cited is $20 billion. And the accompanying allegation is that the asset was undervalued.

This is not a tactics story. It is a story about who gets to see the invoice, who gets to sign the invoice, and who gets to declare that the invoice is correct.

Context: three fronts, one name

In July, The Times of London published details of a plan to let private investment flow into a FIFA commercial vehicle. That vehicle, as described, would run the World Cup and competitions across the FIFA system. The valuation cited: around $20 billion. But the question European football governance has posed is not "is $20 billion a lot or a little" — it is "how was that $20 billion calculated, who calculated it, and why is nobody allowed to see the arithmetic."

UEFA responded through the courts. It filed applications with US federal courts seeking to compel FIFA to disclose relevant documents. Alongside that runs a second track: a potential criminal complaint in Switzerland — where FIFA is headquartered, and therefore where prosecutors have jurisdiction over an association registered in Switzerland. This is a two-tier strategy: use US courts to extract documents, use those documents to open a Swiss criminal door.

The third front comes from Washington. Democratic members of the US House Judiciary Committee have described FIFA's cooperation with their probe as "woefully inadequate." This is the detail I consider the most important in the whole affair, and I will return to it below.

Infantino responded with three moves: a pledge to do "what is right," a pledge of an independent governance review, and a description of events as a "smear campaign." He also emphasised a "culture of dialogue," "trust," and his pursuit of a fourth term. The candidacy deadline is November 18.

The core: the trap of an asset with no listed price

Let us start with the hardest part, because I think most commentary is avoiding it.

FIFA is not a listed company. There is no market-standard public balance sheet, no shareholders cross-examining at an annual meeting, no securities regulator standing behind it. FIFA is a private association governed by an internal political system of 211 member federations. In such a structure, the "market price" of the World Cup does not exist as an objective figure. It is a negotiated figure, and more importantly, it is a figure negotiated by the very people who stand to benefit from it.

The $20 billion deal is not a sale of an asset. It is a transfer of the right to harvest cash flows across decades into the hands of a group of private investors, at a price set at a moment when FIFA holds complete control over the valuation. Nobody outside can say whether $20 billion is right or wrong, because there is no outside data. And that is precisely the problem — not the number, but the solitude of the person who invented the number.

I have followed valuation debates in football for years, from transfer fees to broadcast rights. In any liquid market, price is set by a seller and a buyer in opposition; if one side holds an information advantage, we call it information asymmetry. Here, one party is the seller, the valuer, the approver, and will sit on the council overseeing the outcome.

UEFA does not need to prove that $20 billion is wrong. It only needs to prove that nobody was allowed to check the number. Legally, that is a far stronger position than producing a counter-figure.

Why US federal courts?

This is the detail I think European commentators are underestimating.

If the goal were merely to investigate an association headquartered in Switzerland, Geneva or Zurich would be the natural venue. But UEFA chose US federal courts. That points to two possibilities: either the documents, contracts, or entities involved have US roots; or US disclosure mechanisms are judged far more forceful than the Swiss alternatives.

Both possibilities have real implications for Vietnamese and Southeast Asian football, and I will spell that out in the transmission section. For now, the point to hold onto is this: when a football association is dragged into another country's civil-criminal procedure, football's autonomy — the principle FIFA always invokes to refuse outside interference — is no longer intact. It becomes an argument, not a fact.

Two blocs, and one person standing between them

The power map now splits in two.

The first bloc is the transparency bloc: UEFA leading, with the English FA as an insider asking questions, with other European federations leaning in, and with the US House Judiciary Committee as a notable external actor. Its strength is legitimacy — it speaks of disclosure, of accountability, of the right to inspect.

The second bloc is the incumbent bloc: Infantino and the FIFA machine, with explicit backing from the Saudi Arabian federation and Qatar. Its strength is procedure — it controls candidacy rules, controls the Council, controls the Congress agenda.

Debbie Hewitt stands at the junction. She chairs the English FA, meaning she is under pressure from Premier League clubs — commercial entities with a direct interest in understanding FIFA's financial structure. She is also a FIFA Vice President, meaning she is formally part of the machine she is questioning. And she is a FIFA Council member, meaning she has a seat in the very room on October 15.

This is an inverted conflict of interest: the person obliged to protect the organisation is the person forcing the organisation to account. It makes her morally strong and internally weak. Her European rivals may exploit that, or she may lose internal leverage inside FIFA because of it.

On Saudi Arabia, I do not think this is a personal relationship. It is a long-term strategy: buying influence within global football governance, resonating with its role hosting major events and with an expanding club investment portfolio. Backing an incumbent president is the cheapest investment for a seat at the table.

And Qatar — the country that hosted the 2026 World Cup — has similar logic at a different timing: protecting a structure in which it has invested relationships.

The message from Jeddah is not a message to Europe

This is where I want to be blunt.

Infantino's Instagram post was made from Jeddah, amid the presence of Saudi figures. He chose Instagram — not a formal press statement, not a press conference, not a document sent to member federations.

In communications terms, that is a deliberate choice. A formal press statement addresses institutional counterparts. An Instagram post addresses a mass audience. When a FIFA president under institutional questioning chooses the mass channel, the recipient of the message is not the institutions questioning him. The recipient is the 211 member federations, and more specifically, the federations that will vote.

Read that way, "culture of dialogue" and "trust" are not concessions. They are a discursive frame designed to position opponents as aggressors and himself as the conversationalist.

People call me a contrarian. I treat that as a job description. And my job description here is to say: an independent review announced immediately after an opponent files in court is usually not reform. It is damage control.

That does not make it worthless. It only means its value depends on two concrete questions: who conducts the review, and what they are permitted to see. If the answer is "people chosen by FIFA" and "documents FIFA decides to hand over," then it is not an independent review. It is self-audit, and self-audit always passes.

Infantino, the $20bn Deal, and the Fight Over FIFA's Valuation of Power

The Balogun case: smallest detail, largest signal

Among the issues listed, one name is not financial: Folarin Balogun, the striker who switched international allegiance to the United States, and FIFA's handling of that file.

Many will skip this detail. I will not, for a very specific reason.

When a financial matter is raised alone, it is treated as an incident. When a financial matter is raised alongside a process matter — such as handling an eligibility switch — it moves from "incident" to "pattern." And a pattern is far harder to defend than an incident.

I do not have enough information to judge the rights and wrongs of the specific Balogun file. But as a communications strategy, placing it on the same list as the $20 billion deal is a calculated move: it attempts to construct the image of an organisation failing across multiple domains, not merely erring on a price.

Right outcome, wrong player name — still better than right name and wrong outcome. But in this case, both sides are trying to define what the "outcome" is.

Smear campaign as an incomplete shield

"Smear campaign" is a communications response, not a legal argument. It answers neither the question the court poses nor the question the House Judiciary Committee poses.

But it has a real function: it shifts the focus from "where are the documents" to "who is attacking whom." For one segment of the FIFA electorate — small federations with limited resources, limited interest in legal procedure in Europe or America, but intense interest in how FIFA distributes development money to them — this frame can work.

This is the point European analysis usually misses. FIFA politics is not decided by opinion in London or Munich. It is decided by votes in Congress, and those votes largely belong to federations whose most important question is "what do I get next term."

A debate about a $20 billion valuation does not directly answer that question. And that is the entire reason this shield, however legally incomplete, may be electorally sufficient.

The November 18 deadline and the challenger's trap

UEFA says it will find a credible candidate. But no name has been put forward.

This is the challenger bloc's greatest weakness, and it is more dangerous than it looks. In a system requiring a FIFA presidential candidate to be formally nominated by a member federation and to clear certain nomination thresholds, "having someone credible enough to run" and "having someone who can actually be nominated" are entirely different things.

Dissatisfaction is a necessary condition. A viable candidate is a sufficient condition. And the sufficient condition is missing.

If by November 18 no candidate clears the nomination gate, then months of legal and media pressure will not convert into a ballot. It will exist only as a cloud — and clouds do not unseat anyone.

That is why I consider the November 18 deadline the single most consequential risk point in this whole sequence. If a candidate emerges, the nature of the risk shifts from "reputational" to "electoral defeat." If not, the nature of the risk remains "reputational" — and reputation can be managed.

Transmission down to the rest of football

A private investment deal into the vehicle running the World Cup does not stop at FIFA.

If the model is established, it is highly replicable. Continental confederations, major national leagues, commercial rights structures — all could follow the same template: spin the commercial asset into a separate vehicle, invite private capital, value it internally, and run long-term cash flows.

That is why a valuation scandal at FIFA level could freeze an entire wave of football financialisation, not just one deal. Private investors do not fear controversy. They fear uncertainty about ownership and about their documents being subpoenaed by a court in a third country.

For developing football markets, including Southeast Asia, the impact arrives along two paths. Path one: global commercial capital slows because legal risk rises. Path two: smaller federations gain additional arguments to demand transparency in development-fund allocation, because they can see that even FIFA's largest asset may go unexamined.

Which path prevails depends on whether this affair ends with disclosed documents or with a quiet settlement.

Where I could be wrong

This is the section I am obliged to write, and not to appear modest.

I could be wrong in assuming legal pressure will not convert into electoral change. Possibility one, which I may underweight: a sufficiently credible candidate could still emerge late, be nominated by a heavyweight federation, and turn what looks like a procedural matter into a genuine confidence vote. FIFA history has precedents.

Possibility two: the undervaluation allegation could be substantiated enough to open a Swiss criminal investigation. If that happens, my entire electoral calculus collapses, because the question is no longer "who gets elected" but "who gets bail."

Possibility three, and this is the one that worries me: both sides may be exaggerating for negotiating purposes. UEFA may be using the courts as leverage to get a seat in the new commercial structure. FIFA may be using "smear campaign" to stretch time past the ballot. In that scenario, nobody wins publicly, and there is an undisclosed settlement — which, for football, is worse than a noisy scandal.

I once got one thing right and everything else wrong — this article is about the part I got right. But I also remember clearly that getting the outcome right while getting the mechanism wrong is just luck presented nicely.

What to watch

On October 15, in FIFA's Council room in Zurich, a FIFA Vice President will ask a FIFA President about a number. On November 18, a name will either appear or it will not.

If I had to place a bet, I would bet on documents not being fully disclosed before the ballot, an independent review announced with a narrow scope, and a fourth term secured on the back of support from federations outside Europe. But I would place a smaller bet on the opposite, because at 58 I still have not learned to stop believing football can surprise me.

And what I really want to know, more than the ballot result, is this: if a $20 billion asset of world football cannot be examined by anyone outside one room, whose is it, really?

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