The Stolen Tempo: When Munich's Training Ground No Longer Whispers with Kimmich
**Core answer**: Joshua Kimmich's high touch count (most touches in the match) and Germany's 75% possession failed to produce penetration in a 0-1 home defeat to Greece in the UEFA Nations League. Critics, including Mario Basler, argue the Kimmich-centric build-up is predictable and slows tempo, making Germany easier to defend against compact blocks. (57 words) **Key facts**: - Germany recorded 75% possession but lost 0-1 at home to Greece in the UEFA Nations League, with the goal coming from a deflected Dimitrios Kourbelis strike. - Joshua Kimmich was Germany's most-touched player and monopolised set pieces, but was criticised for slowing build-up play. - Mario Basler, via his podcast, called Kimmich "not world-class" and urged Julian Nagelsmann to intervene tactically. - Germany have only one point from their opening two Nations League fixtures, increasing pressure on coach Nagelsmann and captain Kimmich. - Bastian Schweinsteiger described German football as being in "average territory," pointing to broader talent and identity issues. **Source attribution**: Goal.com match report and pundit commentary aggregation, published October 2024; quotes via Basler Ballert podcast and Sport.de. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A**: Q: Why was Joshua Kimmich criticised after the Germany vs Greece match? A: Kimmich was criticised for being the sole tempo-setter in Germany's build-up, with high touches but slow, predictable circulation that lacked penetration against Greece's compact defensive block. Q: What does Germany's 75% possession against Greece indicate? A: It indicates Germany controlled the ball but lacked cutting edge; the possession dominance did not translate into scoring chances or a result, with a deflected goal deciding the match. Q: What is Germany's Nations League situation after the Greece defeat? A: Germany have one point from their opening two Nations League group-stage matches, with crucial tests against Serbia and an away return to Greece in the coming days, placing early pressure on coach Nagelsmann and captain Kimmich.
Munich night, that autumn, I sat for a long time after the final whistle. The stadium was empty, only maintenance workers cleaning the stands. And I remember that silence — the only sound left after a defeat no one wanted to believe.
75% possession. A goal conceded from a deflected shot. A 0-1 home defeat to Greece. Those are the numbers on the scoreboard, but for me, someone who spent seven seasons sitting in a corner of the training ground counting every touch of the ball, the 75% figure says nothing about strength. It only says one thing: the ball passed through too many feet, but went nowhere.

At 68, I have witnessed four generations of German players. From the generation of ruthless passing machines in the 1990s, to the technical generation of Klinsmann and Löw, to the youthful generation of 2026. They differed in their feet, but shared one thing: they always knew how they had to play. This autumn, for the first time in more than three decades of following German football, I see a German national team that doesn't know who it is.
Context: A defeat not found in the scoreline
The Greece defeat in the Nations League took place in a special context. It was Julian Nagelsmann's first home match as national team head coach, after leaving Bayern Munich and taking over the position Hansi Flick left behind. A home debut, fans expecting a convincing performance. They got a defeat.

What's notable is how the team lost. Greece did not press high. They sat deep, organised a mid-low defensive block, conceded the midfield to their opponent, and waited for counter-attacking moments or set pieces. That is the style that has become the identity of Greek football since 2026, and it remains remarkably effective two decades later.
The goal came from a Dimitrios Kourbelis strike, a shot from outside the box deflected by a German defender before flying into the net. The goalkeeper could do nothing. It is the kind of goal pundits call "a lucky goal for the opponent, unlucky for the home team." But for me, after more than half a century writing about football, I learned one thing: no goal is entirely lucky. That shot came after a build-up phase where the German defence had sagged. The space in front of the box appeared not because Greece was brilliant, but because Germany had lost its rhythm.
Core: When one midfielder becomes the entire system
Joshua Kimmich is one of the most complete midfielders of his generation. I have followed him since his days playing for the Stuttgart youth team, through RB Leipzig, and throughout nearly a decade at Bayern Munich. No one can doubt his passing ability, game reading, or stamina. But one thing has changed in how the German national team operates, and it relates directly to him.
In the Greece match, almost every German ball went through Kimmich's feet. He was the player with the most touches, the initiator of most attacking phases, and the executor of nearly all set pieces. Former international Mario Basler, whom I once interviewed at a press event in Munich years ago, bluntly criticised on his podcast that Kimmich is not a world-class player, and that the Kimmich-centric style is making Germany predictable.
Basler is famous for his sharp commentary. But this time, I must admit: there is some truth in his criticism.
The problem is not Kimmich's ability. The problem is that the German national team has built a playing style that depends too heavily on one individual. Kimmich receives the ball in a deep-lying midfield position, frequently facing an opponent's midfield that has already organised. He has no space to turn, no through-ball options, and is forced to pass sideways or backwards. Each such pass slows the attacking tempo, allowing the opponent to drop back and reorganise their defensive block.
Kimmich touches the ball the most, but those touches all occur in the area Greece wants him to have the ball: in front of their defensive block, where no pass is truly damaging.
When a midfielder becomes the centre of every ball, he is no longer a player. He is the system. And when that system is read by the opponent, the whole team is read along with it.
Contrarian angle: Concentration is not strength
This is what I want readers to reflect on. In modern football, people often praise midfielders with high touch counts. But a high touch count does not automatically equate to positive influence.
There are two types of central midfielders. The first is the tempo-setter, the one who decides when to accelerate, when to slow down, when to switch play. The second is the safe ball-keeper, the one who recycles possession without creating attacking value. Kimmich in the Greece match belonged to the second type — not because he is inferior, but because the system around him did not give him the chance to be the first type.
At Bayern Munich last season, Kimmich was used at right-back in some matches. There, he had space to advance, time to observe before receiving the ball, and teammates in midfield to share build-up responsibility. He did not need to be the centre of every ball. He could be part of the system, instead of carrying the whole system on his shoulders.
People remember goals. I remember the silences between two beats of the ball. And in the Greece match, that silence was long enough for me to finish two pages of notes before Germany had a genuinely dangerous moment.
The counter-intuitive point here is: to improve attacking capability, sometimes you must reduce the role of your best player. You must distribute build-up responsibility to at least one other midfielder — someone capable of through-balls and off-ball movement to open space for Kimmich. With a second midfielder beside him, Kimmich can push higher, face opponents in lower areas, and create genuine threat instead of just circulating safe passes.
I saw this with the French national team in 2026 when N'Golo Kanté and Paul Pogba shared midfield responsibility, allowing Antoine Griezmann and Kylian Mbappé to focus on attacking. Distributing responsibility did not diminish individual strength. It multiplied collective strength.
German football and the question of identity
There is one detail I want to recall. Bastian Schweinsteiger, whom I once interviewed at a German national team training session years ago, stated that German football is currently in "average territory." That is a heavy statement from a World Cup champion.
Russia 2026 taught me that a team can stay silent throughout a tournament and still win. But it also taught me that silence has two types: the silence of focus, and the silence of lacking ideas. The German national team is now in the second category.
Looking at the squad, you see many good players. Jamal Musiala, Florian Wirtz, Kai Havertz, Leroy Sané. This is not a team lacking talent. This is a team lacking a clear tactical idea. And a clear tactical idea does not come from having a midfielder with the most touches. It comes from knowing where you want to attack, when, and how.
In modern football, top teams are shifting toward fast transition play, where the moment of losing the ball is the most dangerous moment to attack. The German national team under Nagelsmann is playing in the opposite direction: slow possession, circulation through midfield, waiting for the opponent to make mistakes. Against a well-organised opponent like Greece, that approach does not work.
Signals from the training ground
I have spent many years sitting at training grounds from Camp des Loges to Kazan, from Munich to Lisbon. The training ground never lies. It only whispers to those who sit and stay. And what I heard from recent German national team sessions is the whisper of an incomplete transition.
Kimmich is the captain. He has leadership responsibility, and that responsibility is not just the armband on his sleeve. It is knowing when to speed up the tempo, when to hold the ball, when to yield the central role to a teammate. That is a skill not every good midfielder possesses, and it does not come from touching the ball more.
The training ground never lies. It only whispers to those who sit and stay. And what I heard from Munich in recent weeks is the whisper of a team trying to escape dependence on one individual without losing its identity.
The Serbia match three days after the Greece defeat will be the first test. Not about results — results may or may not come in one match. But about how the team operates. Will Kimmich continue to be the centre of every ball? Will a second midfielder emerge beside him to share responsibility? Will Nagelsmann adjust the midfield structure to create more attacking options?
These questions cannot be answered by one match. But they will begin to reveal answers over the next two to three weeks.
What remains
I have witnessed four generations of German players. The generation of Lothar Matthäus and Jurgen Klinsmann played with winning instinct. The generation of Michael Ballack played with physical power. The generation of Schweinsteiger and Manuel Neuer played with a balance of technique and mentality. The current generation plays with... something I have not yet defined.
Perhaps that is normal in a transition period. No team maintains peak performance continuously for decades. But it could also be a sign of a deeper problem: impatience in building a long-term tactical idea.
What I know for certain is: Paris in the summer of 2026 taught me that a team can have all the brightest stars in the world and still fail at the decisive moment. Russia in the summer of 2026 taught me that victory does not come from having the most good players, but from those good players understanding their roles in a clear system.
The current German national team has enough good players. The only remaining question is whether they have enough time and patience to find that system — before pressure from the Nations League turns a tactical question into a media crisis.
I will sit in the corner of the training ground. That is my job. And I will continue counting Kimmich's touches, not to judge him, but to understand where his team is heading.
One beat does not make a song. One match does not make a football life. But 75% possession with only one goal conceded — that 75% says this team still doesn't know how it wants to play.

